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Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of
Self-Selection and Contextual Effects
AINA GALLEGO, FRANZ BUSCHA, PATRICK STURGIS AND DANIEL OBERSKI*
Contextual theories of political behaviour assert that the contexts in which people live inﬂuence their
political beliefs and vote choices. Most studies, however, fail to distinguish contextual inﬂuence from
self-selection of individuals into areas. This article advances understanding of this controversy by tracking the
left–right position and party identiﬁcation of thousands of individuals over an eighteen-year period in England
before and after residential moves across areas with different political orientations. There is evidence of both
non-random selection into areas and assimilation of new entrants to the majority political orientation.
These effects are contingent on the type of area an individual moves into and contextual effects are weak
and dominated by the larger effect of self-selection into areas.
It is unexceptional to remark that the political preferences of a national population are not
randomly distributed across geographical areas. We know considerably less, however, about
how this spatial clustering comes about. Contextual theories of political behaviour assert that
elements of the environment in which individuals are situated exert a causal inﬂuence on the
political parties and policies they prefer.1 People, the argument goes, progressively assimilate
through a variety of social-psychological mechanisms to the dominant political orientation of
the environments in which they live. Consistent with these theories, a long tradition of research
in electoral geography has examined the cross-sectional correlation between individual political
preferences and social and political characteristics of local contexts.2
Despite the large body of existing research in this area, however, the question of whether
local contexts actually cause political preferences to change remains contested. Scholars have
long argued that the correlation between individual political preferences and contextual
characteristics is driven, in whole or in part, by self-selection of people into areas with
* Gallego: Institut de Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (email: agallego@ibei.org); Buscha: Department
of Economics and Quantitative Methods, University of Westminster (email: buscha@westminster.ac.uk);
Sturgis: Department of Social Statistics and Demography, University of Southampton (email: p.sturgis@
soton.ac.uk); Oberski: Methodology Department, Tilburg University (email: d.l.oberski@tilburguniversity.
edu). The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council through the
grant for the National Centre for Research Methods (NCRM; grant reference: RES-576-47-5001-01) and
from the Marie Curie Actions of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under REA grant
agreement no. 334054 (PCIG12-GA-2012-334054). The code utilized to produce the results is posted
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The British Household Panel Study, however, does not allow dissemination of the micro-data.
1 Agnew 1987; Books and Prysby 1988; Burbank 1997; Cox 1969; Ethington and McDaniel 2007; Huckfeldt
and Sprague 1995; Johnston and Pattie 2006.
2 Andersen and Heath 2002; Butler and Stokes 1974; Crewe and Payne 1976; Johnston et al. 2004; Johnston,
Pattie and Allsopp 1988; McAllister et al. 2001; Miller 1978.
congruent political beliefs.3 It is our contention in this article that this longstanding debate
remains unresolved because previous studies based on cross-sectional data have not been
able to separate self-selection and contextual effects from one another convincingly. Although
falling some way short of the gold standard of random assignment of individuals to areas, a
longitudinal research design provides a considerably more satisfactory means of identifying
the independent effects of assimilation and self-selection. This is because panel data
enable the tracking of changes in political preferences before and after individuals move to
contexts with different political majorities. Yet, because of the strong data requirements that
longitudinal approaches impose, few examples of this type of strategy can be found in the
existing literature.
This article advances understanding in this area by assessing the causal effect of contexts on
individual political orientations by tracking the preferences of individuals before and after
residential moves, over an eighteen-year period. We do not seek to address the full range of
causes and political consequences of internal migration, but focus our attention on two narrow
yet fundamental research questions: Do people select into areas that exhibit majority political
beliefs congruent with their own? And are individual political preferences inﬂuenced by the
political orientation of the area into which an individual moves? To foreshadow our later results,
our ﬁndings show that people are more likely to choose areas in which to live that are congruent
with their pre-existing political preferences. Yet political orientation plays only a very limited, if
any, role in location choice. Rather it is the socio-economic characteristics of individuals
that are correlated with political preference, such as work and parental status, which are
consequential in this regard. Self-selection into areas occurs, in short, for non-political reasons.
We also ﬁnd that in the years following a residential move, an individual’s political preferences
become more aligned with the majority political orientation of the area into which they moved.
However, this process of assimilation is both weak and contingent upon area type; in England
only those moving into strongly Conservative areas from other types of area exhibit evidence of
contextual effects.
Establishing that both self-selection and, albeit limited, contextual effects exist is important
for several reasons. In a fundamental sense, it provides political scientists with a better
understanding of the origins of political preferences. From a more practical perspective, both
processes are likely to have important political consequences because they produce, over time,
more spatially polarized political preferences. In politically homogeneous communities,
residents are less likely to be exposed to diverse opinions, with negative implications for social
and political tolerance, and the majority party will have larger margins of victory, resulting in
less competitive elections. Geographical polarization of political preferences has also been
shown to generate electoral biases in the translation from votes to seats in majoritarian systems
and affects the incentives of parties to modify their policy platforms.4
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we review the existing
literature on the geographical clustering of political preferences. A discussion of the limitations
of existing methodological approaches to untangling contextual effects and selection
mechanisms leads us to conclude that a longitudinal research strategy is required. We then
describe the dataset and key measures to be used in our analysis and detail our model-ﬁtting
strategy, before presenting our empirical results. We conclude with a discussion of the
limitations of our own approach and a consideration of the substantive implications of our
ﬁndings.
3 Dunleavy 1979; Kelley and McAllister 1985; King 1996; McAllister and Studlar 1992.
4 Chen and Rodden 2009; Rodden 2010; Rodden 2012.
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THE SOURCE OF THE SPATIAL CLUSTERING OF POLITICAL PREFERENCES : CONTEXTUAL
EFFECTS OR SELECTION?
Scholars have argued that contextual inﬂuence occurs through a variety of social-psychological
mechanisms,5 including interpersonal contact and persuasion,6 party mobilization,7 exposure to
shared local socio-economic conditions,8 common local interests,9 and exposure to low-
intensity information cues.10 For instance, theories of interpersonal contact argue that members
of the political majority will tend to have their views reinforced, whereas those in the minority
will change their views through processes of persuasion and conformity, generating a more
homogeneous community outlook over time. Strong local party branches can also persuade
local residents to change their political views through outreach activities.
A large body of empirical evidence supports the main prediction of contextual theories in
showing that there is a robust correlation between individual political preferences and area-level
characteristics. For instance, Butler and Stokes showed that residents of British parliamentary
constituencies vote for the local majority more frequently than would be expected for the
population as a whole.11 Similar correlations between measures of aggregate political
orientations and individual political preferences have been replicated many times since.12
Other studies have shown that socio-economic characteristics of neighbourhoods, variously
deﬁned and measured, predict vote choice above and beyond individual level characteristics.13
Many studies have also found evidence consistent with the mechanisms hypothesized to
underpin assimilation effects, such as interpersonal discussion or political mobilization.14
While the large majority of existing studies rely on cross-sectional evidence, some have used
short-run panels. Pattie and Johnston examined the characteristics of individuals who switched
parties between the 1987 and 1992 general elections in Britain and found that people reporting
discussion partners who supported a different party were more likely to have changed
allegiance.15 Johnston et al. showed with data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
that people in the same constituency had changed their votes in similar directions across
elections in 1992 and 1997, leading them to conclude that ‘place matters’.16 However, these
two-wave studies remain somewhat inconclusive about causal order. That is to say, it may be
the case that individuals who do not identify strongly with a party are both more likely to select
discussion partners with different opinions and to switch parties. Hence, with only a few
exceptions, it is still true that ‘the standard approach in studies of context is to examine the
effect that an aggregate-level compositional measure has on an individual behavior or attitude
… covariation between the individual variable and aggregate variable is taken as evidence of a
contextual effect’.17
5 While existing work focuses mostly on social mechanisms, other contextual characteristics such as climate
or geographic features can also conceivably affect political behaviour.
6 Butler and Stokes 1974; Huckfeldt, Ikeda and Pappi 2005; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995.
7 Denver and Hands 1997; Pattie, Johnston and Fieldhouse 1995.
8 Books and Prysby 1988.
9 Cutler 2007.
10 Cho and Rudolph 2008; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992.
11 Butler and Stokes 1974.
12 E.g. Cox 1969; Crewe and Payne 1976; Taylor and Johnston 1979.
13 E.g. Andersen and Heath 2002; Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp 1988; Johnston et al. 2005; McAllister et al.
2001; Miller 1978.
14 For a review, see Johnston and Pattie 2006.
15 Pattie and Johnston 2000.
16 Johnston et al. (2001), p. 107.
17 Baybeck and McClurg (2005), p. 494.
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There are good reasons to assume that an individual’s choice of a residential location will be
correlated with prior political preferences. While it is unlikely that political preferences have a
strong direct causal effect on residential choices, an indirect inﬂuence seems more plausible.
This is because, when deciding where to relocate, movers must balance a broad range of
preferences and constraints, including local housing prices, distance to work, quality of services,
and tastes over the type of neighbourhood and the features of the house.18 Political preferences
are correlated with the socio-economic characteristics that constrain the choice of destination,
such as income and family situation. Preferences are also correlated with tastes for many types
of public goods (safety, scenic landscapes, cultural events, nightlife) which different localities
provide.19 Because of differences in both socio-economic constraints and location preferences
we expect that those on the left and on the right will exhibit different location choices when they
move and, speciﬁcally, that they will be more likely to move to politically like-minded
communities.
Recent research on the dynamics of partisan support have shown that, in the United States at
least, movers tend to select areas that have majority political preferences more similar to their
own than their original location.20 While these studies provide evidence of non-random
selection into areas, they tell us nothing about contextual effects and do not examine whether
self-selection is political in nature. Consistent with the view that self-selection trumps
contextual effects, critics of contextual effect theories have pointed out that the correlation
between contextual characteristics and individual preferences generally becomes negligible, or
zero, when controlling for individual level characteristics.21 Hence, summarizing the critics’
position in the debate, King concludes: ‘The geographical variation is usually quite large to
begin with, but after we control for what we have learned about voters, there isn’t much left for
contextual effects’.22
Concerns about selection bias can, of course, be mitigated by controlling for socio-economic
characteristics, which inﬂuence both the propensity to move and political preferences. A
conditioning strategy, though, requires that all the requisite control variables are known and
measurable, which seems unrealistic given that many of the candidate variables are notoriously
difﬁcult to measure in surveys (for example, housing tastes, early socialization experiences,
personality). Thus, statistical control using cross-sectional data is unlikely to be a wholly
effective strategy for dealing with selection bias. In summary, despite advances in both data and
method, doubts remain over the core claim of theories of contextual effects: that contexts cause
changes in political attitudes and behaviour.
A more robust strategy for estimating the effects of contexts on political preferences is to
make use of data containing longitudinal information about the same individuals over time. The
primary advantage of repeated measurements or panel data is that, under certain model
speciﬁcations, it is possible to partial out all observed and unobserved time-invariant
characteristics of individual units.23 As Halaby puts it, ‘the problem of causal inference is
fundamentally one of unobservables, and unobservables are at the heart of the contribution of
panel data to solving problems of causal inference’.24 The incorporation of a longitudinal
18 Rabe and Taylor 2010.
19 E.g., see Florida (2003) on cities of the creative class; and Tiebout (1956) on political orientation and
preferred bundles of taxes and services.
20 Cho, Gimpel and Hui 2012; McDonald 2011.
21 Kelley and McAllister 1985; McAllister and Studlar 1992.
22 King (1996), p. 160.
23 Halaby 2003; Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 2002.
24 Halaby (2003), p. 2.
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dimension yields crucial additional leverage on questions of causal order, making it possible to
model within-individual change as a function of preceding events.25 Because this approach is
based on the analysis of change in both dependent and independent variables within individuals
over time, the estimated model coefﬁcients are purged of the effects of all ﬁxed (or ‘time-
invariant’) respondent characteristics. Such ﬁxed characteristics comprise both the ‘usual
suspects’ such as gender, age cohort, and ethnicity, as well as less easily measurable variables
such as personality traits and pre-adult socialization experiences. We are unaware of any
existing study which has used this type of design to evaluate the extent and magnitude of self-
selection and political assimilation to areas. This article has been motivated by the need to
address this longstanding lacuna.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
To estimate the effect of area-level political orientation on individual political preferences, we
have used the BHPS. We tracked individuals who moved across electoral constituencies over an
eighteen-year period and observed whether movers were more likely to choose constituencies
where their pre-existing views were closer to the views of existing residents than other potential
choices of location (self-selection). Additionally, we evaluated whether the self-selection effects
observed were political in nature, which is to say that individuals chose ‘like-minded’ areas
because of their political orientation. We also assessed whether individuals adopted the political
preferences prevalent in their new contexts over time.
Sample
The BHPS is a large, high-quality repeated measures survey in which a stratiﬁed, multi-stage,
random sample of British households had been interviewed annually since 1991. Computer-
assisted face-to-face interviews were attempted with all household members aged 16 years or
older. The initial Wave 1 household response rate was 74 per cent. Extensive efforts were made
to track responding individuals across waves when a household had moved address, or when an
individual moved from an existing household to a new one, such as when adult children had left
home, or when a cohabiting couple separated. The study achieved a tracking rate averaging
95 per cent across all waves. The BHPS was thus ideally suited to our objectives because it
contains a large number of residentially mobile individuals for whom self-reports of political
preferences are observed before and after a move.
Our analysis uses eighteen waves of data from 1991 to 2008 inclusive, with almost 10,000
individuals clustered within over 5,000 households in the ﬁrst wave (1991). We restrict our
focus to England only, excluding households in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
because the party systems in these countries are sufﬁciently different from England to make
combined analyses difﬁcult to interpret. We also exclude observations of those aged under 18 in
order to match our analysis sample with the voting age population in England. We include ‘new
sample members’ who join the BHPS through the formation of new households with ‘original
sample members’ as well as ‘re-entrants’ (i.e. those who had been non-respondents in the
previous wave). These inclusion criteria yield an analysis sample of 17,373 individuals,
who provide a combined total of 158,000 unique observations over the eighteen waves. The
average number of waves completed by individuals is 9.14 and 4,100 individuals responded
in all eighteen waves. To deal with the issue of non-random attrition, we include a range of
control variables that predict drop-out from the study. Our estimates are, therefore, unbiased
25 Allison 1994.
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under the ‘missing at random (MAR)’ assumption, which we consider to be plausible in the
current context.26
Individual Political Preferences
The BHPS offers two options for specifying individual political preferences. The ﬁrst is a
standard measure of party identiﬁcation, which was administered in all eighteen waves; the
second is a multi-item scale designed to measure people’s ‘left–right’ economic value
orientation, which was administered in Waves 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14 and 17.27 Each measure has
contrasting advantages and disadvantages. Party identiﬁcation was measured in every wave and
enables us to detect potential assimilation effects which are not based on changes in an
individual’s underlying preferences and beliefs, for example as a result of differences in the
quality of candidates. By contrast, the left–right scale provides a ﬁner-grained measure of
political orientation, which enables detection of smaller changes across and within individuals
over time and is not subject to the potentially distorting inﬂuence of tactical voting. Because
of their differing theoretical and empirical properties we undertook all analyses using both
measures of political preference. For the left–right scale, we took the ﬁrst principal component
of the six items, which is appropriate for these items.28 For party identiﬁcation, we considered
only supporters of the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives. This yields a binary
variable for party support which is considerably more straightforward to handle in a panel data
regression framework than a nominal variable with more than two categories.
Areal Units
An important question in the study of contextual effects is how the areal units deﬁning spatial
location should be deﬁned. The mechanisms through which contextual inﬂuence operates can
manifest themselves at small (e.g. interaction with neighbours), intermediate (e.g. party
mobilization in a constituency), or large (e.g. regional media) spatial scales. Studies of the
inﬂuence of spatial scales on political behaviour have found, as in other substantive contexts,
that choice of scale is consequential for the estimates obtained.29 In this study, we have used
electoral constituencies as our areal units. Constituencies are the key electoral boundary in ﬁrst-
order, parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom. In England, parliamentary constituencies
contain an average of 70,000 voters, having approximately the population size of a small town.
While interpersonal interactions with neighbours that might result in political assimilation
happen at ﬁner-grained levels of geography, the constituency level should still be capable of
capturing local conditions and interactions in school and work-place settings that require
some short-range mobility. Additionally, since party organizations work to win a majority of the
vote within the constituency boundaries and constituencies share the same MP, the political
environment within a constituency will probably be more internally homogeneous than the
country as a whole.
Of more practical importance, however, is the fact that constituencies are the lowest
geographical level at which it is possible to derive a useable measure of aggregate political
26 That is, we consider it unlikely that political orientation is a strong determinant of drop-out from the study.
Although the BHPS contains a longitudinal weight, using this to correct for differential attrition is not attractive
because any unit with a single missing wave of data over the eighteen years of observation is dropped from the
weighted estimator.
27 Evans, Heath and Lalljee 1996; Heath, Evans and Martin 1994.
28 Sturgis 2002.
29 Cutts and Fieldhouse 2009; Johnston et al. 2007.
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orientation for the period in question. Electoral wards, which would be preferable with
regard to size (they are smaller) are problematic because of the limited nature of information
that can be attached to them and because their boundaries changed substantially between
1991 and 2008, rendering longitudinal analysis difﬁcult. Other boundaries, such as census
output areas,30 have no feasible way of being linked to electoral results or to other measures
of aggregate political orientation. Thus, while our choice of areal unit is not perfect, we
believe it to be the best amongst the available alternatives. We return to the implications
of our use of constituencies as the areal unit for the interpretation of our ﬁndings in the
discussion section.
While English constituency boundaries were quite stable in the period between 1991 and
2008, the redistricting for the 1997 general election affected a non-trivial number of
constituency boundaries. However, most of the boundary changes affected only a small number
of electors and the results we present here are robust to excluding observations located in
constituencies which were subject to boundary changes during the reference period.31
Area-Level Political Orientation
We focus on the political orientation of the constituency as the main independent variable at the
contextual level. Our measure is based on the electoral results for the four parliamentary
elections held in 1992, 1997, 2001 and 2005. An intuitively appealing strategy would be to
deﬁne constituency-level political orientation as the ratio (or similar function) of the vote share
of the two main parties. However, this is challenging because of the sometimes signiﬁcant
role of tactical voting and of minor parties, which vary across constituencies and elections.
Neither would it be clear how to apply vote shares to constituencies in non-election years.
Therefore, we applied a typology to constituencies, placing them into one of six mutually
exclusive categories:32
— Safe Conservative constituencies (N = 154): The Conservative party won a parliamentary
seat in all four elections.
— Safe Labour constituencies (N = 211): The Labour party won a parliamentary seat in all
four elections.
— Marginal Conservative constituencies (N = 12): The Conservative party won a parliamen-
tary seat in three of the four elections.
— Marginal Labour constituencies (N = 111): The Labour party won a parliamentary seat in
three of the four elections.
— Safe or marginal Liberal-Democrat constituencies (N = 31): The Liberal-Democratic party
won a parliamentary seat in three or four elections.
— Mixed constituencies (N = 47): None of the three main parties won a seat in three or four of
the elections.
30 Martin 2008.
31 Constituency identiﬁers in the BHPS are over-written with the new constituency code when boundaries
change. This means that it is not possible to identify which respondents in our analysis sample changed to a
different constituency without moving house due to the 1997 boundary revisions. However, we are able to
identify respondents who are resident in constituencies which were created in 1997 and therefore we can estimate
models including and excluding this group. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in the patterns reported in the
analyses.
32 In case of boundary revision, the coding matches any constituency revised in 1997 to the 1992 constituency
with which it has the largest overlap (see Norris 2005).
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During the period of analysis, parties other than the main three won a parliamentary seat once
in eight constituencies,33 and only in one constituency did a different party win two elections.
The mixed category is mostly made up of constituencies in which one of the three large parties
won two elections and another of the large parties won the other two elections. Thus, these are
the most competitive constituencies, where no party has a clear dominance. This classiﬁcation
of constituencies captures large differences in voting patterns. For instance, in the 1992 election
the Conservative party won on average 57 per cent of the vote in safe Conservative seats but
only 33 per cent in safe Labour seats. The Labour party received 18 per cent of the vote in safe
Conservative seats and 53 per cent in safe Labour seats.
Residential Mobility
In our analysis sample, we observed a total of 14,500 residential moves from one wave to the
next, which represents an average annual move rate of just over 9 per cent across the sample as
a whole. Many of these relocations are, however, over a small distance within the same
constituency and so would not be expected to result in discernible change in the external
political environment. Therefore, we further restricted our deﬁnition of ‘movers’ to individuals
who relocated to a different parliamentary constituency. This reduced the number of moves we
observe by approximately half, yielding a total of 7,437. Using this deﬁnition, 69 per cent of
respondents did not move at all, 17.5 per cent moved once, 7 per cent moved twice and 6.5 per
cent moved three times or more during the period of observation.34
Table 1 shows one-year transition probabilities (as percentages) for moves between different
constituency types. Only individuals who were observed in at least two consecutive waves can
be included in transition tables, which results in a reduction of the sample size from 142,000 to
125,000 observations.35 The diagonal row in Table 2 comprises observations which remained
in the same constituency type in any two-year period. The majority of observations did not
move into different constituency types. However, of the 36,900 observations in safe
Conservative constituencies, 315 moved into safe Labour constituencies in a subsequent
year. Similarly, of the 41,100 observations in safe Labour constituencies, 417 moved to a safe
Conservative constituency in a subsequent year. Of the 28,000 observations in marginal Labour
constituencies, approximately 400 moved to safe Labour and safe Conservative constituencies
respectively.
Because the inclusion of the full set of transition probabilities results in categories with small
cell sizes we collapsed the full set of transitions into the following six categories:
1. No move
2. Moves from any constituency type (apart from safe Conservative) into safe Conservative
3. Moves from any constituency type (apart from safe Labour) into safe Labour
33 These are: Bethnal Green and Bow, Birmingham Sparkbrook and Small Heath, Brentwood and Ongar, East
Ham, Staffordshire South, Tatton, West Bromwich West, West Ham.
34 While the United States is widely considered to have high rates of residential mobility, one-year mobility
rates are similar to those observed in Britain; 12 per cent of the US population moved to a different address in
2005, while 11 per cent of the population in Britain did so (Molloy, Smith and Wozniak 2011). Data from the
2001 Census and administrative records suggest that about 6.7 million UK residents, or 11.4 per cent of the
population, moved from one address to another in the previous twelve months (Champion 2005). Most of these
moves are over short distances, with approximately two ﬁfths moving less than 2 km away and only one third
moving more than 10 km away.
35 All observations in the ﬁrst wave (1991) of the BHPS do not have earlier information and can, therefore, not
be used. Individuals who drop out of waves cannot provide transition information.
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4. Moves from safe Conservative into safe Conservative
5. Moves from safe Labour into safe Labour
6. All other move types.
It is moves of Types 2 and 3 which are of greatest analytical interest because they represent a
clear change in the political orientation of the area in which an individual lives.36 They can be
considered, therefore, as ideal test-cases for theories of contextual effects. We focus our
attention on these two move types in the analyses that follow, although analyses have been
undertaken for all move types and will be made available upon request.
METHOD
To estimate the effect on individual political preferences of people moving to an area with a
different political context, we use a panel data model with ﬁxed effects and distributed lags and
leads.37 We include lagged effects because the inﬂuence of a new area on a mover is unlikely to
occur immediately, potentially taking several years or more to materialize. The baseline model
has the following form:
yit ¼
X5
k¼0
MovCon
0
i;tkβk + x
0
itλ + eit; (1)
where the political preferences of the i-th person in the t-th year, yit, are modelled as depending
on the type of move in the preceding ﬁve years,MovCon′i,t−k, a design vector corresponding to
TABLE 1 BHP3 Constituency Trasition Probabiilities
Time period, t+1
Time period, t Safe Con. Safe Lab. Safe Lib. Marg. Con. Marg. Lab. Mixed Total
Safe Con. 35,985 315 105 32 303 196 36,936
97.43 0.85 0.28 0.09 0.82 0.53 100
Safe Lab. 417 39,969 104 32 505 124 41,151
1.01 97.13 0.25 0.08 1.23 0.30 100
Safe Lib. 123 91 5,531 3 59 33 5,840
2.11 1.56 94.71 0.05 1.01 0.57 100
Marg. Con. 38 17 3 1,543 15 9 1,625
2.34 1.05 0.18 94.95 0.92 0.55 100
Marg. Lab. 437 483 83 20 26,756 125 27,904
1.57 1.73 0.30 0.07 95.89 0.45 100
Mixed 174 113 38 13 141 11,083 11,562
1.50 0.98 0.33 0.11 1.22 95.86 100
Total 37,174 40,988 5,864 1,643 27,779 11,570 125,018
29.73 32.79 4.69 1.31 22.22 9.25 100
Source: BHPS 1991–2008.
Note: The table shows the total number of moves over all transition pair-years and, below these, the
average percentage of respondents transitioning in such pair-years.
36 In principle moves from safe Conservative to safe Labour constituencies and vice versa are of greatest
theoretical interest, although our sample size is insufﬁcient to go to this level of granularity.
37 Blanden et al. 2012; Laporte and Windmeijer 2005.
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the six categories of move type described in the previous section, and ‘no move’ as the reference
category. Time-varying covariates are collected in the vector xit. At the individual level we
control for sex, age, age squared, educational level, income, social class, employment status,
health status, marital status, and parental status. Where models are estimated with ﬁxed effects,
time-invariant characteristics such as sex are excluded. To control for spurious effects caused by
unobserved differences between individuals that are time-invariant, each person’s observations
are centred on the within-person mean. That is, we use time-demeaned data such that an
individual’s score at time t is subtracted from their person speciﬁc mean over all observations
across all time points ðyit ¼ ~yit y
~
i:Þ. The well-known consequence of using time-demeaned
data is that all time-invariant characteristics of sample units are ‘differenced out’, yielding the
ﬁxed effects model.
The coefﬁcients of primary interest in Equation 1 are the lagged coefﬁcient vectors β
−k where
k is set to a maximum of 5. The choice of a ﬁve-year maximum lag is a trade-off between our
theoretical expectation that it may take several years for a contextual effect to be manifested and
the fact that extending lags beyond ﬁve years results in small cell sizes and, therefore, imprecise
estimates. Moreover, as we shall show later, increasing the number of lags to nine years does
not alter our key substantive ﬁndings. One way of thinking about how to interpret the lagged
coefﬁcients is to consider a hypothetical person who moves to a safe Labour constituency one
year but then moves back the next year: β
−k, labour will then be the effect on political preferences
of that one-time move after k years, controlling for time-invariant unobserved variables and
time-varying covariates. However, people typically stay in their new place of residence for
longer than one year, so it is also of interest to know what the effect of the move on preferences
will be when the effect is aggregated over ensuing years. This ‘long-run effect’ can be obtained
by summing the coefﬁcients over the lag vector:
βlong-run ¼
X5
k¼0
βk (2)
Hypothesis tests of zero long-run effects can be performed by obtaining the sampling variance
of β^long-run, which by standard methods, can be shown to be:
varðβ^long-runÞ ¼
X5
k¼0
varðβ^kÞ + 2
X
k< l
covðβ^k; β^lÞ (3)
Note that this means that individual hypothesis tests performed on the lagged effects β
− k may
be non-signiﬁcant while the overall hypothesis test on βlong-run is signiﬁcantly greater than 0.
By using a ﬁxed effects model with time-varying covariates, we control for possible
confounding due to unobserved between-person differences, as well as observed differences due
to the covariates. Although this is already a strong research design, confounding could
conceivably still occur if the probability of moving is correlated with the propensity to change
political preferences. For example, becoming a parent is an event that can cause both a
residential move and a change in political preferences. Blanden et al. propose controlling for the
effect of such ‘pre-programme trends’ by including ‘lead’ dummies in the model.38 The
coefﬁcients for the effect of the future on the present, γ+ k, should not be interpreted causally, but
as evidence for selection effects on the change in preferences. By including leads in the model,
our ﬁnal speciﬁcation becomes:
yit ¼
X5
k¼0
MovCon
0
i;tkβk +
X5
k¼0
MovCon
0
i;t + kγ + k + x
0
itλ + eit (4)
38 Blanden et al. 2012.
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In addition to their substantive interpretation as indicators of political selection into areas, the
inclusion of leads also enables us to obtain estimates of the lagged effects, adjusted for non-
random selection into areas. Thus, our control for time-constant, time-varying, as well as trend
selection effects motivates the interpretation of the lagged coefﬁcients β
−k and their long-run
versions βlong-run as the effect of the constituency on an individual’s political preferences.
Finally, it should be noted that the use of lags and leads in their raw form results in reduced
sample size. This is because for some observations, we do not observe political preferences ﬁve
years before and after a move. Rather than dropping such observations we set the unobserved
prior and subsequent moves to 0 and include a vector of dummies representing ‘missingness’ in
the model, although we do not report the coefﬁcient estimates in our results. Speciﬁcation tests
show that our ﬁndings are substantively unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of these cases.
RESULTS
We begin by presenting some descriptive statistics before moving to more causally-focused
analyses. An implication of contextual theories of political behaviour is that the magnitude of an
assimilation effect should (initially at least) increase over time, because the opportunity for and
experience of the various inﬂuence mechanisms will grow as a function of time spent in a locale.39
Thus, we should expect the association between constituency type and individual policy
preferences to increase over the number of years an individual has lived in the area. Figure 1 shows
percentage support for the Conservative party and the mean of the left–right scale by type of
constituency and the number of years the individual has lived at their current address.40
Individuals who live in safe Conservative constituencies are likely to support the
Conservative party even immediately after moving to their new place of residence.
Additionally, the longer the period of residence within a safe Conservative constituency, the
more likely an individual is to support the Conservatives. Conversely, individuals in safe
Labour constituencies, while considerably more likely to support the Labour party, show no
trend towards increasing support for Labour the longer they have lived in a safe Labour
constituency. This may be due, partially at least, to a ceiling effect because the level of support
for Labour in safe Labour constituencies is already close to 75 per cent at year zero. The pattern
for the left–right scale is clearer and more consistent, with individuals in safe Conservative
constituencies expressing more right-wing views the longer they have lived in that area and the
opposite being the case for individuals in safe Labour constituencies. Thus, the BHPS provides
quite strong preliminary evidence of contextual effects; people are closer to the aggregate
political orientation of their constituency the longer they have lived in it. However, although
Figure 1 shows an apparent trend over time, the data is analysed cross-sectionally and the
variation is, therefore, between rather than within individuals. Thus, the patterns we observe
may have emerged due to non-random selection of individuals into (and out of) areas rather than
to the effect of areas on individuals. It is to this possibility that we now turn via regression
analysis.
Table 2 presents the results of our regression models for the left–right value scale and party
support over ten columns, with each column representing a different model speciﬁcation.
39 A corollary example is the long-established association between the political preferences of married and
co-habiting couples. Alford et al. (2011) argue that, if the intra-spousal correlation is due to inﬂuence rather than
self-selection, we should observe partners becoming more similar to each other the longer they are together.
40 The ‘time lived in constituency’ variable is derived from the address record rather than by self-report. We
limit the upper bound of time at address to ten years because ‘time at address’ is increasingly confounded with
age as ‘time at residence’ increases.
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TABLE 2 Panel Regression Models for Political Assimilation and Selection Effects
Left–right score Supports Conservative party
Move type, and timing† (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Leads, from any to safe Conservative
t+5, 5 yrs after 0.191* −0.011 1.467*** 1.353
(0.095) (0.064) (0.160) (0.430)
t+4, 4 yrs after 0.188* −0.016 1.675*** 1.319
(0.089) (0.058) (0.169) (0.376)
t+3, 3 yrs after 0.166* −0.078 1.414*** 1.114
(0.078) (0.056) (0.133) (0.282)
t+2, 2 yrs after 0.153* −0.049 1.499*** 0.967
(0.070) (0.055) (0.130) (0.249)
t+1, 1 yr after 0.051 −0.024 1.297** 1.166
(0.070) (0.052) (0.105) (0.286)
Contemporaneous move, from any to safe Conservative
t0, yr of move 0.253*** 0.230** 0.206** 0.047 0.035 1.521*** 1.456*** 1.593*** 1.114 1.124
(0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.051) (0.053) (0.123) (0.120) (0.139) (0.258) (0.281)
Lags, from any to safe Conservative
t
−1, 1 yr before 0.159* 0.130 0.147 0.085 0.065 1.414*** 1.354*** 1.471*** 1.047 1.080
(0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.054) (0.057) (0.120) (0.117) (0.136) (0.246) (0.269)
t
−2, 2 yrs before 0.156* 0.129 0.107 0.020 −0.001 1.329** 1.285** 1.380** 0.744 0.750
(0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.057) (0.059) (0.120) (0.118) (0.138) (0.190) (0.200)
t
−3, 3 yrs before 0.207* 0.190* 0.133 0.139* 0.130* 1.235* 1.209* 1.198 0.865 0.899
(0.089) (0.088) (0.085) (0.059) (0.061) (0.117) (0.117) (0.124) (0.226) (0.243)
t
−4, 4 yrs before 0.176 0.173 0.115 0.045 0.025 1.206 1.185 1.271* 0.620 0.654
(0.095) (0.096) (0.091) (0.065) (0.067) (0.122) (0.122) (0.143) (0.164) (0.179)
t
−5, 5 yrs before −0.001 −0.007 −0.050 0.088 0.073 1.197 1.180 1.250* 0.821 0.843
(0.098) (0.098) (0.091) (0.066) (0.068) (0.120) (0.120) (0.135) (0.215) (0.228)
Leads, from any to safe Labour
t+5, 5 yrs after −0.056 0.108 0.840 0.765
(0.105) (0.080) (0.105) (0.261)
t+4, 4 yrs after 0.071 0.066 0.723** 0.656
(0.093) (0.065) (0.088) (0.229)
t+3, 3 yrs after −0.127 −0.060 0.871 0.954
(0.089) (0.068) (0.095) (0.315)
t+2, 2 yrs after −0.086 −0.166** 0.869 0.770
(0.081) (0.063) (0.089) (0.251)
t+1, 1 yr after −0.065 −0.022 0.912 1.116
(0.070) (0.059) (0.085) (0.328)
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Contemporaneous, from any to safe Labour
t0, yr of move −0.025 −0.004 0.045 −0.003 −0.022 0.870 0.930 1.071 1.376 1.323
(0.083) (0.082) (0.080) (0.059) (0.062) (0.083) (0.091) (0.109) (0.393) (0.403)
Lags, from any to safe Labour
t
−1, 1 yrs before −0.102 −0.078 −0.056 0.006 −0.017 0.924 0.959 1.091 0.927 0.863
(0.089) (0.088) (0.086) (0.062) (0.065) (0.093) (0.096) (0.117) (0.267) (0.265)
t
−2, 2 yrs before −0.017 −0.014 0.011 0.004 −0.014 0.861 0.875 1.005 0.994 0.970
(0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.067) (0.070) (0.092) (0.094) (0.118) (0.301) (0.310)
t
−3, 3 yrs before 0.063 0.062 0.071 0.040 0.029 0.857 0.864 1.040 0.891 0.866
(0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.067) (0.070) (0.097) (0.098) (0.125) (0.270) (0.275)
t
−4, 4 yrs before −0.159 −0.159 −0.155 −0.201** −0.216** 0.790 0.793 0.789 0.568 0.538
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.078) (0.080) (0.097) (0.099) (0.110) (0.196) (0.192)
t
−5, 5 yrs before −0.034 −0.017 −0.004 −0.046 −0.071 0.958 0.960 1.107 0.784 0.764
(0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.078) (0.081) (0.124) (0.126) (0.154) (0.264) (0.271)
Other move types yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no
Individual controls no no yes yes yes no no no no no
Individual ﬁxed effects no no no yes yes no no no no no
Leads no yes no no yes no no no no no
Constant 0.041* 0.088*** 0.665*** 0.222* 0.277* −1.124* 0.830*** −0.808* n/a n/a
(0.017) (0.022) (0.133) (0.105) (0.108) (0.260) (0.019) (0.200) n/a n/a
Long-run multiplier effects (lags)
Any to safe Con 0.945*** 0.845** 0.639** 0.428* 0.326 5.092*** 4.282** 6.154*** 0.382 0.451
(t0+ t1 + t2 + t3+ t4+ t5) (0.281) (0.283) (0.268) (0.167) (0.188) (2.297) (1.973) (2.896) (0.296) (0.402)
Any to safe Lab −0.274 −0.211 −0.088 −0.200 −0.120 0.449 0.513 1.066 0.502 0.394
(t0+ t1 + t2 + t3+ t4+ t5) (0.303) (0.303) (0.302) (0.197) (0.227) (0.238) (0.275) (0.585) (0.500) (0.450)
N 49,105 49,105 48,974 48,974 48,974 78,573 78,573 72,979 15,542 15,542
Notes: Cluster standard errors in parentheses. Additional move types include Safe Con to Safe Con, Safe Lab to Safe Lab and Other Mover Types.
Individual controls include: age, gender, education, marital status, children, income, class status, employment status, part/full-time, health status and
time dummies. Coefﬁcients in Models 1 to 5 are ordinary least squares, in Models 6 to 10 coefﬁcients are odds ratios. Note that the long-run multiplier
for Models 6 to 10 is derived by summing the exponentiated logit coefﬁcients and converting this to odds ratios rather than summing the individual odds
ratios. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.
†Reference group consists of those who have not moved.
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In Model 1 we include only lags, no individual-level controls and no ﬁxed effects. Model 2 adds
leads to this speciﬁcation. Model 3 contains lags and individual level controls but no leads or
ﬁxed effects, whilst Model 4 introduces individual ﬁxed effects to Model 3. Finally, Model 5
reintroduces lead indicators. The same pattern is repeated for party support in Models 6 to 10,
though now we use a logistic link function because the outcome is binary. In Table 2 we
suppress the results for other move types (such as moving from a safe Conservative
constituency to another safe Conservative constituency) and for the control variables.41 The
results of these additional contrasts make no material difference to our substantive conclusions.
In all models the reference category for the different move types is non-movers. Thus the
coefﬁcients should be interpreted as the effect of making the move type in question on political
preferences, compared to (covariate adjusted) non-movers.
Model 1 in Table 2 shows that moving into a safe Conservative constituency from any other
type of constituency is associated with a signiﬁcant move to the right on the left–right scale
(higher scores indicate more right-wing preferences). The long-run multiplier for this move type is
0.946 (p< 0.001), indicating signiﬁcant and quite substantial contextual effects over the ﬁve years
following the move. The magnitude of this effect is approximately equivalent to the average
cross-sectional difference in left–right scores between a Liberal Democrat and a Conservative
party identiﬁer. The negative coefﬁcients for the effect of moving into a safe Labour constituency
from other constituency types provides some evidence of assimilation for this type of move,
though none of these is statistically signiﬁcant, either singly or in combination. This pattern
corresponds to that which was observed for the cross-sectional analysis in Figure 1, where the
trend for Conservative support was stronger than for Labour support.
Model 2 introduces lead indicators. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the lead dummies suggest that,
before controlling for other characteristics, individuals behave as if they choose their new areas,
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
Those living in a safa Conservative constituency
become more ‘right-wing’ over time
Those living in a safe Labour constituency
become more left-wing’ over time,
albeit at a slower rate
Av
er
ag
e 
‘le
ft-
rig
ht
’ s
co
re
Years lived at current address Years lived at current address
Those in safe Conservative constituencies
Those in safe Labour constituencies
Those in safe Conservative constituencies
Those in safe Labour constituencies
Those living in a safe Labour constituency
strongly support Labour but do not become more or less
supportive over time
Those living in a safe Conservative constituency
become more supportive of the Conservative party
over time
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 s
up
po
rti
ng
 m
ai
n 
co
ns
tit
ue
nc
y 
pa
rty
Fig. 1. Party identiﬁcation and left–right economic values over time lived in constituency
41 These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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at least in part, on the basis of their prior political preferences. Our results suggest that those
moving to safe Conservative areas become signiﬁcantly more right-wing prior to a move. The
coefﬁcient estimates for those moving to safe Labour constituencies are not statistically
signiﬁcant, although they are of the correct sign (they become more left-wing). The long-run
multiplier for those moving to safe Conservative areas between time period 0 and time period 5
has been reduced slightly to 0.845 (p< 0.003), indicating smaller, but still substantial,
assimilation effects after controlling for non-random selection into constituency types.
However, these estimates cannot be considered causal as we have not yet controlled for
selection on observed time-varying and time-invariant characteristics.
In Model 3, we remove the lead dummies and introduce individual level controls for
characteristics which might lead people to relocate to a different constituency and also to change
their political orientation. These are: age, gender, marital status, parental status, household
income, social class, employment status and health status. We also include year dummies to
control for macro-level events in the external environment. Introduction of these controls results
in the lagged coefﬁcients becoming somewhat reduced in magnitude, which suggests that the
assimilation effects observed in Model 1 are at least partly due to non-random selection of
individuals into constituencies. Controlling for these individual characteristics and survey year
reduces the long-run multiplier to 0.639, which although statistically signiﬁcant (p< 0.018),
represents a 30 per cent reduction in magnitude compared to Model 1. Estimates for those
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Fig. 2. Assimilation to left–right values by type of moves over time with extended lags
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moving into safe Labour constituencies change only marginally with the introduction of
controls in Model 3; these individuals become more left-wing over time, although the effect
cannot be distinguished from zero when inference is made to the broader population (ﬁve-year
cumulative estimate = −0.865 (p< 0.772)).
The introduction of individual ﬁxed effects, to control for time invariant characteristics, in
Model 4 reduces the magnitude of the assimilation effects quite substantially, with the
contemporaneous coefﬁcient for Conservative constituency moves, in particular, reduced from
0.206 to a statistically non-signiﬁcant 0.047. However, while the majority of coefﬁcients are
reduced in magnitude, there are exceptions at the three-year and four-year lags for safe
Conservative (0.139; p< 0.05) and safe Labour (−0.201; p< 0.01) constituency moves,
respectively. This suggests that assimilation, rather than occurring immediately after a move,
takes place after some years in the new location. For safe Conservative constituency moves, the
long-run effect is reduced to 0.428, but this is still statistically different from zero (p< 0.011).
For Labour, the long-run multiplier is −0.200 (p<0.310) which suggests that the small apparent
assimilation effect observed after four years is removed when combined with the effects in
the other years.
Finally, Model 5 re-introduces lead dummies in order to control for all forms of self-selecti
on in one model. Results suggest that re-introducing the leads has only a small effect on
the estimates. The leads are statistically non-signiﬁcant for those moving to safe Conservative
constituencies and have little effect on the coefﬁcient estimates of Model 4. The long-run
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Fig. 3. Assimilation to Conservative party support by type of moves over time with extended lags
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multiplier becomes marginally non-signiﬁcant in Model 5. However, none of the lead
coefﬁcients in Model 5 are themselves signiﬁcantly different from zero; hence our preferred
estimates are those in Model 4. For those moving to safe Labour constituencies, however, there
is some limited evidence of political self-selection; two years prior to a move, individuals
moving to a safe Labour constituency become somewhat more left-wing, suggesting that move
choice is related to prior shifts in political orientation, though the magnitude of the effect is
weak. Moreover, political self-selection has no material effect on our conclusions regarding
assimilation for those moving to safe Labour constituencies, with the magnitude and
signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients unaltered by the introduction of the leads.
We now turn to the results for party identiﬁcation, which are presented in Models 6 to 10 in
Table 2. It should be noted that the sample size for some of these models is reduced
substantially compared to the linear speciﬁcations in Models 1 to 5. This is because relatively
few individuals changed their party identiﬁcation between Labour and the Conservatives
during the period of observation and only individuals who change on the outcome contribute
to the parameter estimates in a ﬁxed effects model. We must, therefore, be cautious in our
interpretation of these models, because our power of inference is weak.
The pattern of coefﬁcients across Models 6 to 10 is quite similar to that found for the
left–right scale models. There is evidence in the ‘naïve’ Models 6, 7 and 8 of political
assimilation for individuals moving into safe Conservative constituencies but only weak and
inconsistent support for an effect of moves into safe Labour constituencies. Once individual
ﬁxed effects are introduced in Models 9 and 10, there is no evidence of assimilation occurring
for either type of move. Indeed, these results suggest that individuals moving to safe
Conservative constituencies become less likely to support the Conservative party over time,
although these estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. Long-run multiplier coefﬁcients for
those moving into safe Conservative and safe Labour constituencies are also not statistically
distinguishable from zero.
Because the BHPS has eighteen waves of data, it is possible to extend the annual lagged and
cumulative effects beyond ﬁve years after a move. Presentation of these models in tabular form
is cumbersome, so we show them in graphical summary form in Figures 2 and 3. We present
estimates corresponding to the left–right scale Models 1 and 4 and party support Models 6 and 9
with nine lags instead of ﬁve. This provides a contrast between naïve estimation (lags only
model) and estimation which is more robust to potential confounders.42 Figure 2 shows the
effect of moving to safe Conservative and Labour constituencies on left–right attitudes up to
nine years after a move.
These longer-run estimates produce similar results to those presented in Table 2; a long-run
effect is apparent for left–right attitudes for those moving to a safe Conservative constituency
in the model with individual-level controls only. However, once individual ﬁxed effects and
time-varying individual level characteristics are controlled for, this long-run effect is
approximately halved. There is no commensurate effect on left–right attitudes for individuals
moving to safe Labour constituencies, with or without ﬁxed effects. The models for
party support in Figure 3 also suggest the presence of an assimilation effect for individuals
moving to safe Conservative constituencies, but these are statistically non-signiﬁcant when
individual ﬁxed effects are added to the model. No evidence of assimilation effects is
evident for individuals who move to safe Labour constituencies, even before the inclusion of
ﬁxed effects.
42 The overall pattern is very similar when using different speciﬁcations, e.g. when plotting estimates from
Table 2 with ﬁve lags or from lag and lead models. The additional plots are available upon request.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article we have taken a new approach to addressing an enduring controversy in the study
of political behaviour. While theories which posit a causal effect of geographical context on
individual political preferences have a long tradition in political science, existing studies have
yet to provide convincing evidence that individuals do indeed assimilate, over time, to the
majority preferences of the areas in which they live. Our analyses advance the existing state-
of-the art in this ﬁeld by tracking the political preferences of a large sample of individuals over
an eighteen-year period. Our analysis used panel data models with ﬁxed effects and controls for
time-varying individual characteristics. This longitudinal approach yields a considerably
stronger protection against the primary threat to valid causal inference in standard cross-sectional
designs, namely that individuals choose which areas they wish to move to (and remain in) and that
these choices are themselves correlated with political preferences.
Our results suggest that political assimilation effects were evident in England during the
period 1991–2008 but that these were weak and differential across different types of areas. On
the one hand, movers to safe Conservative seats became more economically right-wing and
more likely to vote Conservative following the move. This suggests that, consistent with the
predictions of contextual theories of political behaviour, moving to a more conservative area
leads individuals to become more aligned in their political preferences with the local majority.
On the other hand, we found no change in left–right attitudes and only very weak evidence of
change in party identiﬁcation amongst movers to safe Labour constituencies.
Several factors may account for the differential assimilation effects across constituency types.
First, people who move to a safe Labour area already have a high probability of voting for the
Labour party and of having economically left-wing attitudes. Thus, the contingent nature of our
ﬁndings may be due to a ceiling effect; there is little scope for movers into Labour areas to
become more left-wing than they already are immediately prior to moving. An alternative
possibility is that the mechanisms through which contextual effects are manifested are less
powerful in safe Labour seats. Safe Labour seats are mostly located in urban areas such as
London, Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle upon Tyne and Liverpool. The social pressure to
conform to the local majority may be less strong in socially diverse, urban areas than in more
homogeneous rural or suburban areas.43 Conservatives, who traditionally value conformity to
existing social norms, may be more likely than those on the left to pressure newcomers to
conform to the local majority position. These possibilities are, however, speculative and it is not
possible to establish, with the data available to us, why moving to a Conservative area has an
effect on political preferences, while moving to a Labour context does not. Be that as it may, the
ﬁnding that contexts have heterogeneous effects is important in its own right because it suggests
that it is necessary, for a complete account, to clearly specify the conditions under which we
should expect areal units to affect political preferences.
With regard to selection into areas, previous studies have demonstrated that American
movers, on average, relocate into areas with more congruent political beliefs than the
constituencies from which they moved.44 Our results show that this kind of geographic sorting
generalizes to the British context; an individual’s existing political preference is a strong and
signiﬁcant predictor of the political orientation of the area into which he or she moves.
However, the ﬁnding that citizens relocate to constituencies that are more congruent with their
43 Labour constituencies are on average poorer and younger; they have more residents who are tenants, have a
low education and are unemployed, but there is more variation in these characteristics across Labour con-
stituencies than across Conservative constituencies.
44 Cho, Gimpel and Hui 2012; Gimpel 1999; McDonald 2011.
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existing political beliefs does not imply that the choice of locale is caused by political
orientation. In our analysis, when individual level controls are introduced, political preferences
prior to the time of moving no longer predict the political orientation of the destination
constituency. This suggests that sorting of politically like-minded individuals into areas arises
indirectly, because people with different political preferences also have different socio-
economic characteristics which are the actual causal determinants of residential location
choices. In short, self-selection into areas appears to be almost entirely non-political in nature.
While our study signiﬁcantly improves on previous attempts to identify contextual effects, it
has limitations of its own which should be acknowledged. In particular our choice of areal unit
(Westminster constituencies) can be criticized for inadequately representing the spatial scale at
which the mechanisms generally thought to underlie assimilation are likely to operate.
Neighbourhood effects theories generally contend that context effects operate primarily through
social-psychological processes, such as interpersonal inﬂuence and persuasion, which are likely
to happen at smaller spatial scales than a parliamentary constituency. Using smaller areal units
would almost certainly result in different estimates of assimilation and selection effects than
those we have presented here.45 While we acknowledge that this problem is pertinent to the
interpretation of our ﬁndings, we do not believe that it invalidates our ﬁndings and conclusions.
As we have argued, the constituency is a substantively important context because it is the
relevant electoral scale in parliamentary elections and political parties are incentivized to target
mobilization efforts strategically across constituencies. In addition, the fact that we ﬁnd
evidence consistent with contextual effects for movers to Conservative constituencies suggests
that the null results for some mover types are not due merely to the use of a large areal unit.
While we cannot conclude that our results will necessarily generalize across different spatial
scales, or to different political contexts, this is not something that we should expect to be the
case in any event. The modiﬁable areal unit problem should not, in short, be taken as a threat to
the validity of our conclusions as it is equally pertinent to any spatial scale that an analyst
happens, or is able, to select.
A second limitation of our approach is that it overlooks other important ways in which
assimilation is likely to take place. In particular, our focus on adult movers means that we
cannot draw conclusions about two important groups: young people and those who reside in the
same area (or same type of area) for long periods. The places where people live in their
childhood, adolescence and early adulthood are likely to shape their political outlook more
profoundly than at other times in their lives.46 Because we focus only on adults aged 18 and
over, we would not detect effects which occur prior to adulthood. And, although it would, in
principle, be possible to break our analyses down across age groups, in practice our sample of
movers is too small to be able to detect differences between age groups that might exist in the
population reliably. Similarly, it is plausible that contextual effects occur for individuals who
never move but are nonetheless inﬂuenced by the changing political environment within their
own locale over time. However, identiﬁcation of causal assimilation effects for non-movers is a
considerably more challenging analytical task than for a sample of movers and consideration of
this important group is beyond the scope of this article.
A third limitation of our research is that it only addresses one possible source of heterogeneity
in treatment effects (the political hue of the destination constituency). Both individual and
contextual characteristics may inﬂuence the extent to which individuals adopt the political
preferences prevalent in their local environments. For instance, the reasons why individuals
45 Fotheringham and Wong 1991.
46 Campbell 2006; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009.
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move – such as getting a new job, moving to a more family-friendly neighbourhood, or
attending university – may themselves shape the propensity to assimilate to the new context.
Very stable local communities may affect newcomers in different ways than gentrifying
communities or places that are growing fast over a speciﬁc period of time. Long-distance moves
that disrupt social relationships may have different implications for political preferences than
short-distance moves where it is easier to maintain pre-existing social networks.
While we acknowledge, then, that our conclusions cannot be generalized without appropriate
caution to other spatial levels or to other population sub-groups, we believe that our ﬁndings are
important nevertheless. The evidence that we have presented suggests that self-selection into
areas is considerably more important than assimilation effects in producing the spatial clustering
of political preferences long observed by political geographers. This conﬁrms the dominance of
selection over assimilation that has been observed in other contexts, including those which have
used experimental designs.47 We have also shown for the ﬁrst time that self-selection into areas
is almost entirely non-political in nature, in the sense that individuals do not choose where to
live on the basis of political preference per se, but as a result of socio-economic characteristics which
are jointly correlated with choice of location and political orientation. Location affects individual
political preferences, but only weakly, in some areas, and for some outcomes. Thus, while contexts
are certainly relevant to our understanding of political preferences, they appear to be considerably less
important than proponents of contextual theories have sometimes maintained.
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